Discuss the main differences, based on the Gorgias, between rhetoric and dialogue. Which is best? Why?
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BOOK- Reading the World IDEAS THAT MATTER second edition.
ARTICLE - Plato frome Gorgias (380 BCE)
plato (circa 428-348 or 347 BCE), one of the greatest philosophers of the ancient world, came of age during an era of almost perpetual warfare. In 431 BEC, the peloponnesian War, between his native Athens and the militaristic city-state of Sparta, began. The war lasted for twenty-seven years, during which time Plato grew up in an aristocratic family and became a disciple of the Greek philosopher Socrates. When the war ended in Athens's total defeat, the Athenian assembly tried and executed Socrates, who had been one of the war's strongest critics. Officially, Socrates was charged with impiety and corrupting the young, but Plato felt that his mentor had been executed because he had spent years engaging the city's people in conversations designed to unmask their foolishness and hypocrisy. Plato recorded Socrates' trial in his Apology.
The war and Socrates' execution affected Plato deeply; he saw both as fruits of Athens's unwise government, in which an assembly of ordinary men made decisions that affected the entire state. Masterminded by a few very persuasive speakers who managed to build consensus within the assembly, these events made Plato especially suspicious of the art of rhetoric, which , he felt, focused on persuasion at the expense of truth. He believed that important questions should be decided by wise leaders and not be subjected to public debate and popular vote.
For Plato, the figures that symbolized rhetoric's dangers were the Sophists, a group of teachers - most of them foreign - who had set up successful schools of rhetoric in Athens. Sophists often taught that the truth of a situation depended on one's perspective, that any argument could be effective if presented well, and that "winning" a debate was more important than discovering the truth. All of these views were anathema to Plato, who believed that the most important thing in life was to discover the truth.
The Sicilian rhetorician Gorgias(circa 483- 376 BCE) was one of the most successful Sophists in Athens. His major discourse, On Nature or the Non-Existent, has not survived, but accounts indicate that it argued against the possibility of knowing, or communicating, anything.Although Plato's dialogue Gorgias is a debate between Socrates and Gorgias about the relative merits of philosophy and rhetoric, such a conversation probably never occurred; Plato often expressed his ideas through fictional dialogues that echoed the kind of persistent questioning for which Socrates was famous. This format is especially apt for the Gorgias, in which Plato focuses on the ultimate purpose of dialogue.
Plato's rhetorical strategy in Gorgias, as in most of his dialogues , in to place his own argument in Socrates' mouth while summarizing his opponent's argument in the person of Gorgias. This strategy can be very effective, but Plato has often been criticized for turning characters such as Gorgias into straw men for his own rhetorical ends.
Gor. Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art.
Soc. Then I am to call you a
rhetorician?
Gor. Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if
you would call
me that which, in Homeric language, "I boast
myself to
be."
Soc. I should wish to do so.
Gor. Then pray do.
Soc. And are we to say that you are able to
make other men
rhetoricians?
Gor. Yes, that is exactly what I profess to
make them, not
only at Athens, but in all places.
Soc. And will you continue to ask and answer
questions,
Gorgias, as we are at present doing and reserve
for another occasion the
longer mode of speech which Polus was
attempting? Will you keep your promise,
and answer shortly the questions which are
asked of
you?
Gor. Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity
longer; but
I will do my best to make them as short as
possible; for a part of my profession
is that I can be as short as any one.
Soc. That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit
the shorter
method now, and the longer one at some other
time.
Gor. Well, I will; and you will certainly
say, that you
never heard a man use fewer words.
Soc. Very good then; as you profess to be a
rhetorician,
and a maker of rhetoricians, let me ask you,
with what is rhetoric concerned:
I might ask with what is weaving concerned, and
you would reply (would
you not?), with the making of garments?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. And music is concerned with the
composition of
melodies?
Gor. It is.
Soc. By Here, Gorgias, I admire the
surpassing brevity of
your answers.
Gor. Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good
at
that.
Soc. I am glad to hear it; answer me in like
manner about
rhetoric: with what is rhetoric
concerned?
Gor. With discourse.
Soc. What sort of discourse, Gorgias?-such
discourse as
would teach the sick under what treatment they
might get
well?
Gor. No.
Soc. Then rhetoric does not treat of all
kinds of
discourse?
Gor. Certainly not.
Soc. And yet rhetoric makes men able to
speak?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. And to understand that about which
they
speak?
Gor. Of course.
Soc. But does not the art of medicine, which
we were just
now mentioning, also make men able to
understand and speak about the
sick?
Gor. Certainly.
Soc. Then medicine also treats of
discourse?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. Of discourse concerning diseases?
Gor. Just so.
Soc. And does not gymnastic also treat of
discourse concerning
the good or evil condition of the body?
Gor. Very true.
Soc. And the same, Gorgias, is true of the
other arts:-all
of them treat of discourse concerning the
subjects with which they severally
have to do.
Gor. Clearly.
Soc. Then why, if you call rhetoric the art
which treats
of discourse, and all the other arts treat of
discourse, do you not call
them arts of rhetoric?
Gor. Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the
other arts
has only to do with some sort of external
action, as of the hand; but there
is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which
works and takes effect
only through the medium of discourse. And
therefore I am justified in saying
that rhetoric treats of discourse.
Soc. I am not sure whether I entirely
understand you, but
I dare say I shall soon know better; please to
answer me a question:-you
would allow that there are arts?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. As to the arts generally, they are for
the most part
concerned with doing, and require little or no
speaking; in painting, and
statuary, and many other arts, the work may
proceed in silence; and of
such arts I suppose you would say that they do
not come within the province
of rhetoric.
Gor. You perfectly conceive my meaning,
Socrates.
Soc. But there are other arts which work
wholly through
the medium of language, and require either no
action or very little, as,
for example, the arts of arithmetic, of
calculation, of geometry, and of
playing draughts; in some of these speech is
pretty nearly co-extensive
with action, but in most of them the verbal
element is greater-they depend
wholly on words for their efficacy and power:
and I take your meaning to
be that rhetoric is an art of this latter
sort?
Gor. Exactly.
Soc. And yet I do not believe that you really
mean to call
any of these arts rhetoric; although the
precise expression which you used
was, that rhetoric is an art which works and
takes effect only through
the medium of discourse; and an adversary who
wished to be captious might
say, "And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic
rhetoric." But I do not think
that you really call arithmetic rhetoric any
more than geometry would be
so called by you.
Gor. You are quite right, Socrates, in your
apprehension
of my meaning.
Soc. Well, then, let me now have the rest of
my answer:-seeing
that rhetoric is one of those arts which works
mainly by the use of words,
and there are other arts which also use words,
tell me what is that quality
in words with which rhetoric is
concerned:-Suppose that a person asks me
about some of the arts which I was mentioning
just now; he might say, "Socrates,
what is arithmetic?" and I should reply to him,
as you replied to me, that
arithmetic is one of those arts which take
effect through words. And then
he would proceed to ask: "Words about what?"
and I should reply, Words
about and even numbers, and how many there are
of each. And if he asked
again: "What is the art of calculation?" I
should say, That also is one
of the arts which is concerned wholly with
words. And if he further said,
"Concerned with what?" I should say, like the
clerks in the assembly, "as
aforesaid" of arithmetic, but with a
difference, the difference being that
the art of calculation considers not only the
quantities of odd and even
numbers, but also their numerical relations to
themselves and to one another.
And suppose, again, I were to say that
astronomy is only word-he would
ask, "Words about what, Socrates?" and I should
answer, that astronomy
tells us about the motions of the stars and sun
and moon, and their relative
swiftness.
Gor. You would be quite right,
Socrates.
Soc. And now let us have from you, Gorgias,
the truth about
rhetoric: which you would admit (would you
not?) to be one of those arts
which act always and fulfil all their ends
through the medium of
words?
Gor. True.
Soc. Words which do what? I should ask. To
what class of
things do the words which rhetoric uses
relate?
Gor. To the greatest, Socrates, and the best
of human
things.
Soc. That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am
still in the
dark: for which are the greatest and best of
human things? I dare say that
you have heard men singing at feasts the old
drinking song, in which the
singers enumerate the goods of life, first
health, beauty next, thirdly,
as the writer of the song says, wealth honesty
obtained.
Gor. Yes, I know the song; but what is
your
drift?
Soc. I mean to say, that the producers of
those things which
the author of the song praises, that is to say,
the physician, the trainer,
the money-maker, will at once come to you, and
first the physician will
say: "O Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you, for
my art is concerned with
the greatest good of men and not his." And when
I ask, Who are you? he
will reply, "I am a physician." What do you
mean? I shall say. Do you mean
that your art produces the greatest good?
"Certainly," he will answer,
"for is not health the greatest good? What
greater good can men have, Socrates?"
And after him the trainer will come and say, "I
too, Socrates, shall be
greatly surprised if Gorgias can show more good
of his art than I can show
of mine." To him again I shall say, Who are
you, honest friend, and what
is your business? "I am a trainer," he will
reply, "and my business is
to make men beautiful and strong in body." When
I have done with the trainer,
there arrives the money-maker, and he, as I
expect, utterly despise them
all. "Consider Socrates," he will say, "whether
Gorgias or any one-else
can produce any greater good than wealth."
Well, you and I say to him,
and are you a creator of wealth? "Yes," he
replies. And who are you? "A
money-maker." And do you consider wealth to be
the greatest good of man?
"Of course," will be his reply. And we shall
rejoin: Yes; but our friend
Gorgias contends that his art produces a
greater good than yours. And then
he will be sure to go on and ask, "What good?
Let Gorgias answer." Now
I want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this
question is asked of you by them
and by me; What is that which, as you say, is
the greatest good of man,
and of which you are the creator? Answer
us.
Gor. That good, Socrates, which is truly the
greatest, being
that which gives to men freedom in their own
persons, and to individuals
the power of ruling over others in their
several states.
Soc. And what would you consider this
to
be?
Gor. What is there greater than the word
which persuades
the judges in the courts, or the senators in
the council, or the citizens
in the assembly, or at any other political
meeting?-if you have the power
of uttering this word, you will have the
physician your slave, and the
trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom
you talk will be found
to gather treasures, not for himself, but for
you who are able to speak
and to persuade the multitude.
Soc. Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very
accurately
explained what you conceive to be the art of
rhetoric; and you mean to
say, if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the
artificer of persuasion,
having this and no other business, and that
this is her crown and end.
Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over
and above that of producing
persuasion?
Gor. No: the definition seems to me very
fair, Socrates;
for persuasion is the chief end of
rhetoric.
Soc. Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite
sure that if
there ever was a man who-entered on the
discussion of a matter from a pure
love of knowing the truth, I am such a one, and
I should say the same of
you.
Gor. What is coming, Socrates?
Soc. I will tell you: I am very well aware
that do not know
what, according to you, is the exact nature, or
what are the topics of
that persuasion of which you speak, and which
is given by rhetoric; although
I have a suspicion about both the one and the
other. And I am going to
ask-what is this power of persuasion which is
given by rhetoric, and about
what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask
instead of telling you?
Not for your sake, but in order that the
argument may proceed in such a
manner as is most likely to set forth the
truth. And I would have you observe,
that I am right in asking this further
question: If I asked, "What sort
of a painter is Zeuxis?" and you said, "The
painter of figures," should
I not be right in asking, What kind of figures,
and where do you find
them?"
Gor. Certainly.
Soc. And the reason for asking this second
question would
be, that there are other painters besides, who
paint many other
figures?
Gor. True.
Soc. But if there had been no one but Zeuxis
who painted
them, then you would have answered very
well?
Gor. Quite so.
Soc. Now I was it to know about rhetoric in
the same way;-is
rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion,
or do other arts have the
same effect? I mean to say-Does he who teaches
anything persuade men of
that which he teaches or not?
Gor. He persuades, Socrates,-there can be no
mistake about
that.
Soc. Again, if we take the arts of which we
were just now
speaking:-do not arithmetic and the
arithmeticians teach us the properties
of number?
Gor. Certainly.
Soc. And therefore persuade us of them?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is
an artificer
of persuasion?
Gor. Clearly.
Soc. And if any one asks us what sort of
persuasion, and
about what,-we shall answer, persuasion which
teaches the quantity of odd
and even; and we shall be able to show that all
the other arts of which
we were just now speaking are artificers of
persuasion, and of what sort,
and about what.
Gor. Very true.
Soc. Then rhetoric is not the only artificer
of
persuasion?
Gor. True.
Soc. Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric
works by persuasion,
but that other arts do the same, as in the case
of the painter, a question
has arisen which is a very fair one: Of what
persuasion is rhetoric the
artificer, and about what?-is not that a fair
way of putting the
question?
Gor. I think so.
Soc. Then, if you approve the question,
Gorgias, what is
the answer?
Gor. I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the
art of persuasion
in courts of law and other assemblies, as I was
just now saying, and about
the just and unjust.
Soc. And that, Gorgias, was what I was
suspecting to be
your notion; yet I would not have you wonder if
by-and-by I am found repeating
a seemingly plain question; for I ask not in
order to confute you, but
as I was saying that the argument may proceed
consecutively, and that we
may not get the habit of anticipating and
suspecting the meaning of one
another's words; I would have you develop your
own views in your own way,
whatever may be your hypothesis.
Gor. I think that you are quite right,
Socrates.
Soc. Then let me raise another question;
there is such a
thing as "having learned"?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. And there is also "having
believed"?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. And is the "having learned" the same
"having believed,"
and are learning and belief the same
things?
Gor. In my judgment, Socrates, they are not
the
same.
Soc. And your judgment is right, as you may
ascertain in
this way:-If a person were to say to you, "Is
there, Gorgias, a false belief
as well as a true?" -you would reply, if I am
not mistaken, that there
is.
Gor. Yes.
Soc. Well, but is there a false knowledge as
well as a
true?
Gor. No.
Soc. No, indeed; and this again proves that
knowledge and
belief differ.
Gor. Very true.
Soc. And yet those who have learned as well
as those who
have believed are persuaded?
Gor. Just so.
Soc. Shall we then assume two sorts of
persuasion,-one which
is the source of belief without knowledge, as
the other is of
knowledge?
Gor. By all means.
Soc. And which sort of persuasion does
rhetoric create in
courts of law and other assemblies about the
just and unjust, the sort
of persuasion which gives belief without
knowledge, or that which gives
knowledge?
Gor. Clearly, Socrates, that which only
gives
belief.
Soc. Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the
artificer of
a persuasion which creates belief about the
just and unjust, but gives
no instruction about them?
Gor. True.
Soc. And the rhetorician does not instruct
the courts of
law or other assemblies about things just and
unjust, but he creates belief
about them; for no one can be supposed to
instruct such a vast multitude
about such high matters in a short time?
Gor. Certainly not.
Soc. Come, then, and let us see what we
really mean about
rhetoric; for I do not know what my own meaning
is as yet. When the assembly
meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or
any other craftsman, will
the rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely
not. For at every election
he ought to be chosen who is most skilled; and,
again, when walls have
to be built or harbours or docks to be
constructed, not the rhetorician
but the master workman will advise; or when
generals have to be chosen
and an order of battle arranged, or a
proposition taken, then the military
will advise and not the rhetoricians: what do
you say, Gorgias? Since you
profess to be a rhetorician and a maker of
rhetoricians, I cannot do better
than learn the nature of your art from you. And
here let me assure you
that I have your interest in view as well as my
own. For likely enough
some one or other of the young men present
might desire to become your
pupil, and in fact I see some, and a good many
too, who have this wish,
but they would be too modest to question you.
And therefore when you are
interrogated by me, I would have you imagine
that you are interrogated
by them. "What is the use of coming to you,
Gorgias? they will say about
what will you teach us to advise the
state?-about the just and unjust only,
or about those other things also which Socrates
has just mentioned? How
will you answer them?
Gor. I like your way of leading us on,
Socrates, and I will
endeavour to reveal to you the whole nature of
rhetoric. You must have
heard, I think, that the docks and the walls of
the Athenians and the plan
of the harbour were devised in accordance with
the counsels, partly of
Themistocles, and partly of Pericles, and not
at the suggestion of the
builders.
Soc. Such is the tradition, Gorgias, about
Themistocles;
and I myself heard the speech of Pericles when
he advised us about the
middle wall.
Gor. And you will observe, Socrates, that
when a decision
has to be given in such matters the
rhetoricians are the advisers; they
are the men who win their point.
Soc. I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias,
when I asked
what is the nature of rhetoric, which always
appears to me, when I look
at the matter in this way, to be a marvel of
greatness.
Gor. A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only
knew how rhetoric
comprehends and holds under her sway all the
inferior arts. Let me offer
you a striking example of this. On several
occasions I have been with my
brother Herodicus or some other physician to
see one of his patients, who
would not allow the physician to give him
medicine, or apply a knife or
hot iron to him; and I have persuaded him to do
for me what he would not
do for the physician just by the use of
rhetoric. And I say that if a rhetorician
and a physician were to go to any city, and had
there to argue in the Ecclesia
or any other assembly as to which of them
should be elected state-physician,
the physician would have no chance; but he who
could speak would be chosen
if he wished; and in a contest with a man of
any other profession the rhetorician
more than any one would have the power of
getting himself chosen, for he
can speak more persuasively to the multitude
than any of them, and on any
subject. Such is the nature and power of the
art of rhetoric And yet, Socrates,
rhetoric should be used like any other
competitive art, not against everybody-the
rhetorician ought not to abuse his strength any
more than a pugilist or
pancratiast or other master of fence; because
he has powers which are more
than a match either for friend or enemy, he
ought not therefore to strike,
stab, or slay his friends. Suppose a man to
have been trained in the palestra
and to be a skilful boxer-he in the fulness of
his strength goes and strikes
his father or mother or one of his familiars or
friends; but that is no
reason why the trainers or fencing-masters
should be held in detestation
or banished from the city-surely not. For they
taught their art for a good
purpose, to be used against enemies and
evil-doers, in self-defence not
in aggression, and others have perverted their
instructions, and turned
to a bad use their own strength and skill. But
not on this account are
the teachers bad, neither is the art in fault,
or bad in itself; I should
rather say that those who make a bad use of the
art are to blame. And the
same argument holds good of rhetoric; for the
rhetorician can speak against
all men and upon any subject-in short, he can
persuade the multitude better
than any other man of anything which he
pleases, but he should not therefore
seek to defraud the physician or any other
artist of his reputation merely
because he has the power; he ought to use
rhetoric fairly, as he would
also use his athletic powers. And if after
having become a rhetorician
he makes a bad use of his strength and skill,
his instructor surely ought
not on that account to be held in detestation
or banished. For he was intended
by his teacher to make a good use of his
instructions, but he abuses them.
And therefore he is the person who ought to be
held in detestation, banished,
and put to death, and not his instructor.
Soc. You, Gorgias, like myself, have had
great experience
of disputations, and you must have observed, I
think, that they do not
always terminate in mutual edification, or in
the definition by either
party of the subjects which they are
discussing; but disagreements are
apt to arise-somebody says that another has not
spoken truly or clearly;
and then they get into a passion and begin to
quarrel, both parties conceiving
that their opponents are arguing from personal
feeling only and jealousy
of themselves, not from any interest in the
question at issue. And sometimes
they will go on abusing one another until the
company at last are quite
vexed at themselves for ever listening to such
fellows. Why do I say this?
Why, because I cannot help feeling that you are
now saying what is not
quite consistent or accordant with what you
were saying at first about
rhetoric. And I am afraid to point this out to
you, lest you should think
that I have some animosity against you, and
that I speak, not for the sake
of discovering the truth, but from jealousy of
you. Now if you are one
of my sort, I should like to cross-examine you,
but if not I will let you
alone. And what is my sort? you will ask. I am
one of those who are very
willing to be refuted if I say anything which
is not true, and very willing
to refute any one else who says what is not
true, and quite as ready to
be refuted as to refute-I for I hold that this
is the greater gain of the
two, just as the gain is greater of being cured
of a very great evil than
of curing another. For I imagine that there is
no evil which a man can
endure so great as an erroneous opinion about
the matters of which we are
speaking and if you claim to be one of my sort,
let us have the discussion
out, but if you would rather have done, no
matter-let us make an end of
it.












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